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INTRODUCTION
In the latest ―to be continued‖ in the story of the Doha
Development Agenda (―DDA‖),1 Director-General Pascal Lamy
suggested ―that Members wish to continue to explore any
opportunities to gain the necessary traction and try to make tangible
progress as soon as possible.‖2 This is a far cry from the earlierexpressed goal of the Group of Twenty and World Trade
Organization (―WTO‖) to complete the Round in 2011.3 The present
slow-down is nothing new; the delegates of the WTO Members have
maintained a dogged, albeit on-and-off, effort to complete the
DDA‘s ambitious goals since the Round‘s inception in 2001.4 But
the ebb and flow of the DDA‘s progress highlights the complexity of
promoting economic development through reconciling the interests
of nations across the economic spectrum.5 Juxtaposed between
1. Ved P. Nanda, Selected Aspects of International Trade and the World
Trade Organization’s Doha Round: Overview and Introduction, 36 DENV. J. INT‘L
L. & POL‘Y 255, 257–59 (2008) (explaining that the DDA, also known as the Doha
Round, is a round of trade negotiations initiated in 2001 with a core objective of
improving developing countries‘ trade prospects); see also The Doha Round,
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm (last
visited Aug. 23, 2011).
2. Director-General Pascal Lamy‘s Statement, Report by the Chairman of the
Trade Negotiations Committee, 1-2 May. 2012, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/news12_e/gc_rpt_01may12_e.htm.
3. Group of Twenty, The G20 Seoul Summit Leaders‘ Declaration, ¶ 9 (Nov.
11–12, 2010), available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul.pdf; Trade
Negotiations Comm., Lamy: ―The final countdown starts now‖, WORLD TRADE
ORG. (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/ news_e/news10_e/tnc_dg_
stat_30nov10_e.htm.
4. See Sungjoon Cho, Doha’s Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 165,
165–67 (2007) (providing a brief history of the Doha Round); see also Nanda,
supra note 1, at 255–56; Raj Bhala, Resurrecting the Doha Round: Devilish
Details, Grand Themes, and China Too, 45 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 1, 5–9 (2009) (citing
multiple negotiation breakdowns over farm tariffs, agricultural subsidies, and
quota protections as particularly contentious).
5. Cho, supra note 4, at 170-73 (discussing deadlocked negotiations arising
from agricultural market issues).
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criticisms as a rich nations‘ club on the one hand6 and attractiveness
as an avenue for a greater share of the world‘s prosperity7 on the
other, the WTO presents an opportunity for developing countries but
also poses a challenge of grappling with the bargaining power of
their developed trading partners.8
In part to address this dilemma, the legal framework of
international trade has provided a place for the special needs of
developing countries since the inception of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (―GATT‖).9 Historically, developing countries
have enjoyed special and differential treatment (―S&DT‖)
purportedly commensurate with their ―development, financial, and
trade needs.‖10 Yet, despite the fact that this phrase is employed in
various places within the WTO‘s legal architecture,11 and lies at the
heart of the test to determine the legality of S&DT granted to
developing countries,12 the phrase has never been defined or given
substantive elaboration in WTO covered agreements, adjudication, or
scholarship.13
6. Id. at 165–66, 168–69.
7. JOHN H. BARTON ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME: POLITICS,
LAW, AND ECONOMICS OF THE GATT AND THE WTO 170 (2006).
8. Id. at 170–71; Richard N. Gardner, The Bretton Woods-GATT System After
Sixty-Five Years: A Balance Sheet of Success and Failure, 47 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT‘L L. 31, 62 (2008).
9. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; PETROS C. MAVROIDIS,
TRADE IN GOODS: THE GATT AND THE OTHER AGREEMENTS REGULATING TRADE
IN GOODS 138-39 (2009) [hereinafter TRADE IN GOODS].
10. Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, ¶ 3(c), L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203-05 (1989) [hereinafter Enabling Clause]; TRADE IN
GOODS, supra note 9 at 138-39; Peter Lichtenbaum, Reflections on the WTO Doha
Ministerial: ―Special Treatment‖ vs. ―Equal Participation‖: Striking a Balance in
the Doha Negotiations, 17 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 1003, 1010-14 (2002).
11. See, e.g., TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, ¶ 3(c); see also GATT art.
XXXVII: 4.
12. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for the
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, ¶ 164, WT/DS246/AB/R
(Apr. 7, 2004) [hereinafter AB Report]; TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 144-45.
13. Gene M. Grossman & Alan O. Sykes, European Communities – Conditions
for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (WT/DS246/AB/R,
DSR 2004:III, 925), in THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE REPORTERS‘ STUDIES ON
WTO CASE LAW 790, 808-09 (Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2007)
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As a result of this lacuna in WTO law and policy guidance, S&DT
granted to developing countries has typically been severely
influenced by politically or special interest-motivated actors in
developed countries.14 The typical vehicle for S&DT is the
generalized system of preferences (―GSP‖),15 through which
developed countries grant tariff concessions or zero-tariff market
access to certain products originating in developing countries.16 For
example, as described by Lance Compa and Jeffrey Vogt17 and
echoed by Robert Howse,18 ―[t]he GSP is a centerpiece of U.S. trade
policy,‖19 which as of 2010 provided ―duty-free entry for about 4,800
products imported into the United States from 131 designated
beneficiary countries and territories, including 44 least developed
beneficiary countries so designated.‖20
In practice, GSP provisions commonly incorporate conditionality
whereby the tariff concession is tied to some requirement that the
developing country must meet to receive the concession.21 Often
included under the rubric of ―linkage,‖22 a term used to describe the
[hereinafter ALI COMMENTARY]; Tomer Broude, The Rule(s) of Trade and the
Rhetos of Development: Reflections on the Functional and Aspirational Legitimacy
of the WTO, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 221, 252-53 (2007).
14. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 147; Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: The
Question of Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT‘L L. 126, 127–28 (2002); Robert Howse,
India’s WTO Challenge to Drug Enforcement Conditions in the European
Community Generalized System of Preferences: A Little Known Case with Major
Repercussions for ―Political‖ Conditionality in US Trade Policy, 4 CHI. J. INT‘L L.
385 (2001) [hereinafter Howse, India’s WTO Challenge]; P. Trachtman,
Institutional Linkage: Transcending ―Trade and . . .‖, 96 AM. J. INT‘L L. 77, 77-78
(2002).
15. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 10, at 137-38.
16. JUAN C. SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, THE GENERALISED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES
AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 187 (2002).
17. Lance Compa & Jeffrey S. Vogt, Labor Rights in the Generalized System of
Preferences: A 20-Year Review, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL‘Y J. 199, 201 (2001).
18. Howse, India’s WTO Challenge, supra note 14, at 386.
19. Compa & Vogt, supra note 17, at 201.
20. United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., Generalized System of
Preferences: Handbook on the Scheme of the United States of America 1,
UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/Misc.58/Rev.2 (2010) [hereinafter U.S. GSP Handbook],
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtsbmisc58rev2_en.pdf.
21. ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 792-93; SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra
note 17, at 220-25.
22. Kevin Kolben, Integrative Linkage: Combining Public and Private
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coupling of trade with non-trade issues,23 these conditions in the GSP
have covered admirable issues such as the enforcement of
internationally-recognized labor standards24 and environmental
protection,25 but have extended to other linkages such as ―good
governance‖26 and, as was the case under the former GSP scheme of
the European Community (―E.C.‖), even a requirement that the
developing country police drug trafficking in its borders.27
This last GSP condition was the target of a challenge by India at
the WTO‘s Dispute Settlement Body (―DSB‖).28 After an
unsuccessful defense of this linkage to the ―development, financial,
and trade needs‖ standard, the E.C. was forced to amend its GSP
system.29 India‘s legal challenge was underpinned by concerns that
Regulatory Approaches in the Design of Trade and Labor Regimes, 48 HARV.
INT‘L L. J. 203, 213–14 (2007); Sonia E. Rolland, Developing Country Coalitions
at the WTO: In Search of Legal Support, 48 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 483, 535–36 (2007).
23. CHRISTIAN BARRY & SANJAY G. REDDY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
LABOR STANDARDS: A PROPOSAL FOR LINKAGE 3-5 (2008); Kolben, supra note 22,
at 203; David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT‘L L. 5, 5–6 (2002).
24. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(G)(1999) (presenting
the U.S. GSP scheme conditioning preferential tariff treatment on ―internationally
recognized worker rights‖); 19 U.S.C. § 2467(4) (1999) (defining ―internationally
recognized worker rights‖); Compa & Vogt, supra note 17, at 202 (explaining that
a country‘s GSP status is directly tied to a country‘s ability to provide for
―internationally recognized workers rights‖).
25. Council Regulation 732/2008, Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff
Preferences for the Period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011 and
Amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission
Regulation EC No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007, art. 8, Annex III, Part B,
2008 O.J. (L 211) 4, 5 (EC) [hereinafter EC GSP Plus].
26. Id.
27. Council Regulation 2501/2001, Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff
Preferences for the Period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004, arts. 10, 25,
2001 O.J. (L346) 5, 8 (EC) [hereinafter EC 2001 GSP].
28. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by India, European Communities
– Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries,
WT/DS246/4 (Dec. 9, 2002) [hereinafter India Panel Request]; see also Request
for Consultations by India, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting
of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/1 (Mar. 12, 2002);
Howse, India’s WTO Challenge, supra note 14, at 386.
29. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 190-91; TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at
145;
Dionysia-Theodora
Avgerinopoulou,
Legislative
Development,
Implementation and Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental Agreements —
The New EC Generalized System of Preferences Scheme, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
828, 835–38 (2006).
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the conditions upon access to the E.C. GSP program enabled
Pakistan to gain preferential access to the E.C.‘s market by meeting a
condition that India argued had little or nothing to do with economic
development,30 not to mention the alleged $300 million that Indian
exporters averred they were losing because of the condition.31 GSPs
were meant to promote economic development,32 but by allowing
developed countries the choice to grant S&DT to some developing
countries and not others, those other eligible developing countries
lose out on economic opportunity.33 While this sort of differentiation
is permissible,34 it thwarts the development of any nation denied the
S&DT and works to further the preference-granting country‘s
interest if left completely at the whim of the preference-granting
country.35 This is not only economically disadvantageous but, as
determined by the Appellate Body (―AB‖), is also inconsistent with
the WTO legal structure.36 For institutional reasons of the WTO and
recipient nations‘ economic competitiveness, GSP linkages should
conform to a legal standard even if they may simultaneously advance
individualistic, social, and political agendas.37
As articulated by the AB, the only WTO-consistent linkages in

30. Panel Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, ¶ 4.38, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003)
[hereinafter Panel Report]; TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 144; Amy Mason,
Note, The Degeneralization of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP):
Questioning the Legitimacy of the U.S. GSP, 54 DUKE L.J. 513, 528 (2004).
31. Mason, supra note 30, at 515.
32. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 160 (―[T]he very purpose of the special and
differential treatment permitted under the Enabling Clause is to foster economic
development of developing countries.‖).
33. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 147 (discussing trade diversion as a
criticism of GSP conditionality).
34. See AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 156 (stating that preference-granting
countries do not have to offer identical tariff preferences to all developing
countries to be nondiscriminatory).
35. See ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 809; see also Debra P. Steger,
Afterword: The ―Trade and . . .‖ Conundrum—A Commentary, 96 AM. J. INT‘L L.
135, 138 (2002).
36. See AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 163 (stating that ―[P]arargaph 3(c) does
not authorize any kind of response to any claimed need of developing countries.‖).
37. See Steger, supra note 35, at 138 (positing that the WTO has solidified into
a rules-based system despite originally being subject to typical treaty and contract
interpretation principles).
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GSPs are those that ―respond positively‖ to the beneficiary country‘s
―development, financial, and trade needs‖38 (for convenience,
―development needs‖). There are at least two consequences of this
legal requirement. First, a GSP condition that fails to respond
positively to a WTO-consistent ―development need‖ is in breach of
Paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause,39 which by its text requires
this ―positive response‖40 and which, under EC–Tariff Preferences,
calls for an objective development need.41
This objective
―development need‖ could be determined by recourse to ―the WTO
Agreement or multilateral instruments adopted by international
organizations.‖42 Second, a developed country conditioning GSP on
such a ―development need‖ must provide non-discriminatory
standards by which a potential recipient developing country can
demonstrate compliance with the condition and then grant the GSP to
all developing countries that so demonstrate compliance; otherwise,
the GSP condition would fail the requirement in Paragraph 2(a) of
the Enabling Clause that GSP must be non-discriminatory.43
The requirement that GSP linkages respond to development needs
thus creates a great challenge to international trade policymakers

38. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 160-65.
39. See Steve Charnovitz, A New WTO Paradigm for Trade and the
Environment, 11 SING. Y.B. INT‘L L. 15, 22 (2007) (highlighting the example that
―[i]f sustainable timber management is not considered a development need, then
the Appellate Body‘s holding would seem to disallow that sort of environmental
conditionality in a GSP programme.‖).
40. Enabling Clause, supra note 10, ¶ 3(c); AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 179;
ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 803.
41. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 163.
42. Id.
43. See id. ¶¶ 187–88; ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 803-04, 809.
There is the additional potential implication that a developed country that ignores a
WTO-consistent development need would be held in breach of its obligation to
offer GSP in a non-discriminatory manner as set forth in Paragraph 2(a) of the
Enabling Clause. To elaborate, suppose a developed country conditions tariff
preferences on some undertaking X, identified as a development need. A
particular developing country may have no need to undertake X, but may as its
own development need require a different undertaking, Y, also identified as a
development need. It would be costly for this developing country to undertake X
and it instead must devote its resources to undertaking Y. It is possible that the
developing country could allege that the developed country is discriminating by
granting tariff preferences based on X but not Y.
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who must design or defend GSP schemes that aim to advance nontrade policy goals. For instance, labor rights linkage incorporated
into a nation‘s GSP serves a laudable social goal.44 But in order to
survive a challenge as to its consistency with WTO law, under the
guidance provided in EC–Tariff Preferences, a nation conditioning
trade preferences upon a labor rights linkage must demonstrate that
promoting labor rights somehow responds positively to the recipient
country‘s development needs.45 With the term ―development,
financial, and trade needs‖ still undefined in WTO law, even eight
years after EC–Tariff Preferences, the expansive question of what
economic development objectives or requirements constitute
―development needs‖ within the constructs of the WTO legal
framework remains a tortuous knot in trade policy.46
The ambiguity around the definition of ―development needs‖
creates challenges for both developing and developed countries as
they consider GSPs. For the developing country, this ambiguity
allows special interest groups in developed countries to enjoy wide
leeway in shaping GSPs according to individualistic agendas.
Developing countries that choose not to comport with these
individualistic agendas will lose out on market access to which they
should be entitled in accordance with WTO commitments.47 For
developed countries, the ambiguity means that meritorious human
rights and social objectives that could be effectively achieved
through GSPs may not enjoy the certainty of enforceability, or worse
still, may falter under a challenge before the WTO DSB.48 To better
coordinate the interests of developed and developing countries as
trading partners, and in the interest of greater legal and policy
certainty, it is necessary to articulate what is meant by ―development,
financial, and trade needs.‖
This article seeks to begin formulating what constitute
―development, financial, and trade needs‖ within the legal
framework of the WTO with the hope of contributing a measure of

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Compa & Vogt, supra note 17, at 200.
ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 803-04.
Id. at 808-10.
See SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 16, at 207-09.
See Howse, India’s WTO Challenge, supra note 14, at 387.
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clarity to the linkage debate.49 Part I briefly reviews, as a backdrop
to the discussion of ―development needs,‖ the negotiating role of
developing countries through important rounds in the WTO‘s
history, the nature of GSPs among leading developed entities in the
international economic system, and the conditionality that GSPs
typically include. To provide the framework for a definition of
―development needs,‖ Part II discusses the AB Report in EC–Tariff
Preferences, the only case to elaborate upon the phrase
―development, financial, and trade needs.‖50 This Part then briefly
discusses the sources of law in the WTO framework that one would
use to determine which economic development needs are consistent
with WTO law. Part III proceeds to articulate specific development
needs that, in light of the standard from EC–Tariff Preferences and
sources of WTO law, fall within the WTO‘s contemplation according
to this article‘s argument. Specifically, this Part discusses market
access, poverty reduction, sustainable development, and education as
WTO-consistent ―development needs.‖

I. FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING LINKAGE AND
―DEVELOPMENT NEEDS‖
A. ACCOMMODATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO
The international trading order has evolved to accommodate, to an
extent, the different international economic position of developing
countries in relation to their developed trading partners.51 These
institutional accommodations indicate WTO Members‘ recognition
that the development needs of developing countries are distinct, as
well as the WTO‘s goal as an institution to promote economic
growth in light of these needs. The existing system of
accommodations for developing countries thus serves as a backdrop
against which to view the specific ―development needs.‖

49. See Steger, supra note 35, at 138-39 (supporting linkage through GSP
while recognizing the limits of viewing the WTO as a contract subject to
interpretation rather than a firm set of rules governing trade relations).
50. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 144-45; Broude, supra note 13, at 253.
51. GATT, supra note 9, at 194; Enabling Clause, supra note 10, ¶ 1;
Lichtenbaum, supra note 10, at 1007-09.
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1. Initial Stages of the GATT
Even during the earliest stages of the post-war trading evolution,
nations realized that rules creating a level playing field irrespective
of a country‘s level of economic development have the unintended
effect of disadvantaging developing countries.52 While arguably
appropriate as between two developed countries, a trade regime in
which a less-developed country (―LDC‖) must compete by the same
tariff structures as a developed country poses a significant challenge
to the LDC.53 In the initial negotiations of the 1947 GATT,
developing countries saw the benefits to trade and were willing to
participate in the envisioned international trading system.54
However, burdened by adverse terms of trade, they sought some
degree of non-reciprocity and ability to protect their fledgling
domestic industries.55 Developing countries were not, however,
recognized as a distinct group in the 1947 GATT‘s drafting,56 and the
only provision allowing for any special circumstances of developing
countries was GATT Article XVIII, Governmental Assistance to
Economic Development.57
GATT Article XVIII, as originally drafted, was a mixed blessing
for developing countries, containing certain special exceptions for
these Contracting Parties but providing only limited access to these
52. AUTAR KRISHEN KOUL, GUIDE TO THE WTO AND GATT: ECONOMICS, LAW
POLITICS 570 (2005) [hereinafter KOUL]; TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at
137; Communication from Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, India,
Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, and
Zimbabwe, Proposal for a Framework Agreement on Special and Differential
Treatment, Preparations for the Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference, ¶ 1,
WT/GC/W/442 (Sept. 19, 2001) [hereinafter Framework Agreement on S&DT].
53. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 137.
54. See BARTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 160 (explaining that developing
countries‘ demands were addressed in Part IV of the GATT agreement).
55. KOUL, supra note 52, at 571.
56. BRIAN MCDONALD, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE URUGUAY ROUND
AND BEYOND 49 (1998); Hunter Nottage, Trade and Development, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 481, 484 (Daniel Bethlehem et al.
eds., 2009); see also Inaamul Haque, Doha Development Agenda: Recapturing the
Momentum of Multilateralism and Developing Countries, 17 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV.
1097, 1107–08 (2002) (arguing that the original trading regime excluded
developing countries from any meaningful participation).
57. GATT art. XVIII; KOUL, supra note 52, at 571; Nottage, supra note 56, at
485.
AND
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exceptions.58 It was not until the 1954-1955 GATT Review Sessions
that developing countries received their first dedicated
accommodation through an amended Article XVIII.59 Under this
amendment, Article XVIII recognized that developing countries may
need to adopt protectionist measures ―in order to implement
programmes and policies of economic development designed to raise
the general standard of living of their people,‖60 that the ―objectives
of [the GATT] will be facilitated by the progressive development of
their economies,‖61 and that protectionist measures for specific
industries may be required to raise living standards.62 Most
importantly, these measures were not derogations from GATT
obligations; rather, they were part and parcel of the GATT
framework for mutual cooperation.63
While this specific provision in the GATT was not heavily utilized
by developing countries, it opened the door for their more active
participation in a way that accommodated their special needs and
curbed their apprehensions of the GATT as a rich nations‘ club.64 In
addition, even from its earliest phraseology, the goal of raising living
standards, beyond the GATT‘s main purpose of market access, is
woven into the text and indicates that the GATT‘s objectives will be
advanced through the economic development of Contracting Parties
with an eye to raising standards of living.65
2. The Tokyo Round and The Enabling Clause
Developing countries continued to negotiate for special and
differential treatment up to and including the Kennedy Round in
58. KOUL, supra note 53, at 571 (noting that GATT Article XVIII requires less
developed countries to negotiate meaningful tariff concessions to receive infantindustry exceptions under the GATT).
59. Id. at 572; Nottage, supra note 57, at 485; Framework Agreement on
S&DT, supra note 53, ¶ 3(a).
60. GATT art. XVIII.2.
61. GATT art. XVIII.1.
62. GATT art. XVIII.3.
63. KOUL, supra note 52, at 572.
64. Id.
65. See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, WTO Winners and Losers: The Trade and
Development Disconnect, 39 GEO. J. INT‘L L. 165, 165 (2007); Chantal Thomas,
Poverty Reduction, Trade, and Rights, 18 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 1399, 1399 (2003).

2012]

DEFINING ―DEVELOPMENT NEEDS‖

49

1962-1967, and they achieved incremental victories along the way.66
Notable among their victories was the creation of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (―UNCTAD‖) in 1964,67 a
body that championed the cause of developing countries.68
Specifically regarding provisions of the GATT, Articles XXXVI,
XXXVII, and XXXVIII were added in 1965 to address developing
countries‘ needs of expanded export earnings, product
diversification, and joint action, respectively.69
These three
provisions resonated most with the GATT‘s overarching objective of
market access70 rather than internal development needs such as
raising standards of living. The most significant victory for
developing countries and their S&DT agenda came in 1979 with the
Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries,71
popularly called the Enabling Clause.72
The Enabling Clause was adopted at the end of the Tokyo Round
and enshrined the principle of S&DT in the GATT framework.73
Later adjudged by the AB to constitute a legal exception to the
cornerstone GATT obligation of most-favored nation (―MFN‖)
treatment,74 the Enabling Clause is recognized as the ―central pillar
of S&DT in WTO law.‖75 The Enabling Clause allows developed
Member States to provide better-than-MFN treatment to developing
countries, and for developing countries to provide the same for one
another so that developing countries may enjoy greater economic
development.76 What started as a temporary measure pursuant to
66. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 140.
67. KOUL, supra note 52, at 574; Framework Agreement on S&DT, supra note
52, ¶ 3(b).
68. KOUL, supra note 52, at 573.
69. Id.; GATT arts. XXXVI–XXXVIII; Framework Agreement on S&DT,
supra note 52, ¶ 3(c).
70. KOUL, supra note 52, at 573–74; Nottage, supra note 56, at 485.
71. Enabling Clause, supra note 10; Framework Agreement on S&DT, supra
note 52, ¶ 3(d).
72. KOUL, supra note 52, at 575; Nottage, supra note 56, at 485–86.
73. KOUL, supra note 52, at 575; Nottage, supra note 56, at 485–86.
74. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 98-103; see also GATT art. I.1; TRADE IN
GOODS, supra note 9, at 137-38; ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 802.
75. Nottage, supra note 56, at 486; AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 90.
76. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 137-38; KOUL, supra note 52, at 575;
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UNCTAD Resolution 21(ii)77 later became a permanent provision of
law among GATT Contracting Parties.78 In particular, the Enabling
Clause allows for Generalized Systems of Preferences in order to
promote the economic development of a less-developed country.79
Initially intended to be a unilateral grant of preferential treatment by
developed countries to their LDC trading partners, the Enabling
Clause and its related trade benefits later evolved into a system in
which developed countries would attach conditions to the
preferential treatment.80
3. Developing Countries’ Voice in the Uruguay Round and the
Marrakesh Agreement
The main emphasis of the Uruguay Round was to create a singular
system with consistent application to all WTO members.81 To that
end, and in light of experience with S&DT that was less favorable
than expected,82 developing countries de-emphasized S&DT during
the Uruguay Round in favor of a consistent, rule-based system and
enhanced market access,83 and enjoyed a far more pronounced voice
during those negotiations.84 Drawing some comfort from the dispute
settlement mechanism established in the Marrakesh Agreement,85
developing countries both gained and made concessions regarding
market access while retaining recognition of their economic

AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 166.
77. Expansion and Diversification of Exports of Manufacturers and SemiManufacturers of Developing Countries, Resolution 21(II), Mar. 26, 1968,
WT/DS246/R (2003).
78. Panel Report, supra note 30, ¶ 7.64; TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 137.
79. Enabling Clause, supra note 10, ¶ 2(a); McDonald, supra note 56, at 50.
80. See Gene Grossman & Alan O. Sykes, A Preference for Development: The
Law and Economics of GSP, in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 255,
257-58 (George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2007) (highlighting a list
of examples of conditions on preferential treatment, including conditions by the
U.S. requiring that recipients do not have communist governments or support
terrorism); see also AB Report, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 107-08.
81. McDonald, supra note 56, at 52.
82. Id.; Nottage, supra note 56, at 487.
83. Nottage, supra note 56, at 487-88.
84. McDonald, supra note 56, at 52; KOUL, supra note 52, at 579-81.
85. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
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development needs.86 Still, S&DT remained an integrated part of the
WTO system after the Uruguay Round, but the form it took was
largely that of allowing developing countries longer timeframes to
implement uniform standards, rather than holding developing
countries to different standards altogether.87 The special needs of
developing countries remained encapsulated in various places in the
relevant WTO agreements88 and Ministerial Declarations89 even if an
articulation of the needs themselves has nowhere been codified.90
4. The Doha ―Development Round‖
Some argue that the developing countries‘ more active voice in the
Doha Round has caused this latest round of trade negotiations to
reach such a seemingly insurmountable impasse.91 In the Doha
Round, which commenced in 2001,92 the interests of developing
countries have been appreciably more prominent.93 Reduction of
agricultural subsidies by developed countries and non-agricultural
market access (―NAMA‖) granted to developing countries
constituted two of the most contentious issues in the Doha Round.94
By early 2006, these had coalesced into a ―triangle‖ of issues,
namely, agricultural subsidies, agricultural tariffs, and industrial
tariffs.95 In order for the Doha Development Agenda to have
succeeded at that stage, the U.S. would have had to reduce its
agricultural subsidies, the E.U. would have had to reduce its
86. KOUL, supra note 52, at 579-80; McDonald, supra note 57, at 53.
87. Lichtenbaum, supra note 10, at 1012–14; Framework Agreement on
S&DT, supra note 52, ¶¶ 7, 9.
88. See, e.g., WTO Agreement pmbl.; GATT art. XVIII; see also KOUL, supra
note 52, at 580.
89. See, e.g., World Trade Org., Decision on Measures in Favour of LeastDeveloped Countries, ¶¶ 1, 3, 33 I.L.M. 1248 (1994); see also KOUL, supra note
52, at 579.
90. Broude, supra note 13, at 252-53.
91. See Nanda, supra note 1, at 255-56.
92. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
93. Peter M. Gerhart, Slow Transformations: The WTO as a Distributive
Organization, 17 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 1045, 1047 (2002) (discussing the WTO‘s
increasing role in the distribution of wealth); Haque, supra note 56, at 1109;
Lichtenbaum, supra note 10, at 1024-25.
94. Cho, supra note 4, at 174-77.
95. Id. at 185.
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agricultural tariffs, and developing countries, led by Brazil and India,
would have had to decrease industrial tariffs.96 Such a compromise
was never reached,97 and the Doha Round was suspended in July
2006.98 Developing countries‘ voices were particularly more
pronounced during the Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong that
was part of the Doha Round,99 and in large part because the Round
highlighted the divergent interests of developed and developing
countries, the Round has produced only tepid results.100 The
developing countries left the Seattle Round prior to Doha with a
unified agenda,101 brought this agenda to the Doha Round,102 and
have stood fast that they will not let another round of negotiations
pass without their interests being heard, even if it means an
impasse.103 It calls to mind a characterization of India‘s Minister of
Commerce and Industry Kamal Nath at the July 2008 Ministerial
Meeting—a trade official remarked that Mr. Nath ―just sat there and
said ‗No‘ for 12 straight hours.‖104
While agricultural subsidies and NAMA were the more headlinegrabbing issues raised by developing countries, the text of the Doha
Development Agenda includes a call for a substantial review of
S&DT in light of the Framework Agreement on Special and
Differential Treatment proposed by Cuba, the Dominican Republic,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (―Framework Agreement‖).105
The DDA echoes the Framework Agreement‘s urging for a review of
all S&DT provisions ―with a view to strengthening them and making

96. Id.
97. Id. at 186-87.
98. Id. at 165. Trade Negotiation Comm., DG Lamy: time out needed to review
options and positions, WORLD TRADE ORG. (July 24, 2006),
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/tnc_dg_stat_24july06_e.htm.
99. Cho, supra note 4, at 180-81.
100. Id. at 183; Nanda, supra note 1, at 261–64.
101. Cho, supra note 4, at 168-69.
102. Id. at 169-70.
103. Id. at 165.
104. Bhala, supra note 4, at 120; John W. Miller, Indian Minister Frustrates
West at Trade Talks, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2008, at A6.
105. Doha Declaration, supra note 92, ¶ 44; Framework Agreement on S&DT,
supra note 52.
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them more precise, effective, and operational.‖106 In particular, the
Framework Agreement calls for ―the establishment of a concrete and
binding [S&DT] regime which is responsive to the development
needs of the developing countries.‖107 The Framework Agreement
includes the following among the desired elements of this S&DT
regime:
(1) mandatory and binding S&DT through the WTO dispute
settlement system,
(2) a reconciliation of the S&DT regime with development
targets, for instance, those identified by the United Nations
General Assembly Millennium Declaration,108
(3) implementation costs of the S&DT regime,
(4) transition periods linked to objective economic and social
criteria,
(5) no prohibitions on growth and development in developing
countries, and
(6) non-automatic application of the concept of a single
undertaking, as contemplated in the Uruguay Round.109
Thus, the Framework Agreement reaffirms the developing
countries‘ stance that their position in the international trading order
is notably different, their legal obligations should be accordingly
adjusted, and the adjustment should be commensurate with their
development needs.
5. Synthesis: Incorporating Development in the WTO as an
Institution
The negotiating history of the WTO framework shows a
progressively greater role played by developing countries. While by
106. Doha Declaration, supra note 92, ¶ 44; Lichtenbaum, supra note 10, at
1028-29; Nanda, supra note 1, at 259.
107. Framework Agreement on S&DT, supra note 52, ¶ 10.
108. United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, ¶¶ 11-23, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000).
109. Framework Agreement on S&DT, supra note 52, ¶ 15.
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no means a sideline player even in the earliest stages, they enjoyed
growing prominence as the timeline moved towards the present and
an undeniable influence in the Doha Round. The goals of developing
countries remain at best partly fulfilled by the WTO system despite
deliberate and overt attempts to accommodate such goals through
S&DT and various other provisions outlining rights and obligations
in the WTO legal framework. But while practice, economic theory,
and rhetoric have all elucidated some of what constitutes developing
countries‘ ―development needs,‖ as referenced in the relevant
provisions in WTO law, the legal basis for identifying specific needs
as falling under the rubric of this term remains to be set forth.

B. GSPS AND CONDITIONALITY
This article submits that greater coherence to GSPs, as a widely
used form of S&DT, will represent a step towards achieving the
Doha Development Agenda‘s goal to make S&DT more ―precise,
effective, and operational.‖110 This increased coherence can be
achieved through defining the ―development needs‖ to which GSP
conditionality must respond111 in light of S&DT‘s goal of promoting
economic development.112 Before reviewing the WTO law and
interpretative elements that may be used to define ―development
needs,‖ this article will briefly discuss GSPs and the linkages they
typically involve, as well as two points regarding this article‘s
argument in light of the legal standard with which GSP linkage must
comport.
1. GSPs in Developed Countries’ Municipal Laws
By agreement of the GATT Contracting Parties, GSP is a
mechanism through which developed countries can assist developing
countries in their economic development by granting them tariff
treatment that is better than the MFN treatment they must afford to
their developed trading partners.113 There are presently thirteen
national or regional GSP schemes reported to the UNCTAD
110.
111.
803.
112.
113.

Doha Declaration, supra note 92, ¶ 44.
AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 163-64; ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at
AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 160-61.
TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 137-38.
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Secretariat,114 among which the largest are offered by the United
States, European Community (―E.C.‖), and Japan as preferencegranting WTO Members.115
Broadly speaking, the U.S. GSP affords duty-free access to
products that are eligible for GSP treatment, come from a designated
beneficiary country, and comport with the GSP rules of origin.116
The value of imports for an eligible product, however, is capped by
the competitive need limitation (―CNL‖) for that product, and, if the
cap is exceeded in a given year, the beneficiary country loses GSPeligibility for that product in the following year.117
Somewhat similar to the U.S. scheme, Japan offers a general
preferential tariff for the importation of industrial and agricultural
goods.118 This scheme allows for duty-free import in some cases,119
subject to quantitative ceilings by product120 and an escape clause
allowing suspension of GSP treatment for a product if it causes or
threatens to cause domestic market disruption.121
The E.C.‘s scheme is more variegated, with eligible products
satisfying the rules of origin receiving different preferential rates, a
feature that replaces quantitative caps on GSP imports.122 Under the
114. About GSP, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV.,
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2309&lang=1 (last visited
Aug. 23, 2011) (identifying the thirteen countries that currently present GSP
schemes: Australia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, the European Union,
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, and
the United States).
115. Rolland, supra note 22, at 536; SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 16, at 237,
239, 242, 244 (analyzing the size and impact of GSP schemes in various nations
including Switzerland, Japan, the United States, and Canada).
116. US GSP Handbook, supra note 20, at 7.
117. Id. at 17 (defining CNLs as limitations on preferential treatment for items
that a beneficiary nation already exports competitively).
118. United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., Generalized System of
Preferences: Handbook on the Scheme of Japan 9–10, UNCTAD/ITCD/
TSB/Misc.42/Rev.3 (2006) [hereinafter Japan GSP Handbook], available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtsbmisc42rev3_en.pdf.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 10.
121. Id. at 11; SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 16, at 196.
122. United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., Generalized System of
Preferences: Handbook on the Scheme of the European Community viii,
UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/Misc.25/Rev.3 (2008) [hereinafter EC GSP Handbook],
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E.C.‘s GSP program, beneficiary countries are then eligible for
additional tariff reductions, termed ―special incentives,‖ in
accordance with the E.C.‘s ―GSP Plus‖ and its conditionality upon
the beneficiary country adopting certain international treaties.123
Two salient factors adding complexity to GSP schemes are
―graduation‖ clauses and conditionality.124 Graduation clauses allow
a preference granting country to exclude a beneficiary country from
GSP treatment when the beneficiary country has achieved a degree
of economic development.125 Conditionality in GSP schemes allows
preference-granting countries to vary or suspend GSP benefits
depending on policies adopted by the beneficiary country.126
Because the AB‘s exploration of GSP focused on linkage, which in
turn gave rise to the legal requirement that GSP linkage must be
reconciled with ―development needs,‖ this article will highlight this
aspect of GSP.
2. Linkages Employed in GSP
Under the overarching rubric of promoting development through
GSP, linkage is a permissible facet to the GSP scheme.127 Linkage in
GSP arises when preferential tariff rates or duty-free access granted
to a beneficiary country are conditioned on the adoption of certain
domestic policies by the beneficiary country.128 These domestic
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtsbmisc25rev3_en.pdf.
123. Id. at viii-ix, xi; EC GSP Plus, supra note 25, art. 8, Annex III.
124. SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 16, at 202.
125. EC GSP Handbook, supra note 122, at viii; Japan GSP Handbook, supra
note 119, at 11; U.S. GSP Handbook, supra note 20, at 17, 56; see also Trade Act
of 1947, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(e) (1994). There is disagreement as to whether WTO
law governs the decision as to whether a developing country is an eligible
developing country under a GSP scheme, separate from whether a linkage
employed by the GSP scheme upon such eligible developing countries is valid, or
is instead a matter of domestic political determination. Compare Broude, supra
note 14, at 255-58 and Kelé Onyejekwe, International Law of Trade Preferences:
Emanations from the European Union and the United States, 26 ST. MARY‘S L.J.
425, 458–59 (1995), with Peter M. Gerhart & Archana Seema Kella, Power and
Preferences: Developing Countries and the Role of the WTO Appellate Body, 30
N.C. J. INT‘ L. & COM. REG. 515, 555-56 (2005).
126. SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 16, at 200.
127. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 162; Howse, India’s WTO Challenge, supra
note 14, at 395-96.
128. Kyle Bagwell et al., It’s a Question of Market Access, 96 AM. J. INT‘L L.
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policies run the gamut, from political, to commercial, to social, to
human rights.129 Under the U.S. GSP scheme, for instance, ―[t]he
President shall not designate any country a beneficiary developing
country‖ eligible for GSP treatment if the country aids or abets any
group that has committed any act of international terrorism,130 fails to
act in good faith in recognizing or enforcing arbitral awards rendered
in favor of U.S. citizens,131 or takes no steps ―to afford internationally
recognized worker rights to workers in the country.‖132 The term
―internationally recognized worker rights‖ is defined to include the
right of association, the right to collective bargaining, the prohibition
of forced labor, prohibition of child labor, and acceptable working
conditions with respect to minimum wages, working hours, and
safety conditions.133
In the E.C.‘s GSP Plus, ―special incentive‖ tariff treatment is
conditioned on ―sustainable development and good governance,‖
requiring the beneficiary country to have ―ratified and effectively
implemented all the conventions listed in Annex III.‖134 These
conventions include international human rights instruments such as
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(―ICCPR‖);135 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (―ICESCR‖);136 and Convention Against Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;137
International Labour Organization conventions including the
Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of
56, 71-72 (2002) [hereinafter Market Access]; Kolben, supra note 22, at 213-14.
129. See infra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.
130. Trade Act of 1947, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(F) (1999).
131. Id. § (b)(2)(E).
132. Id. § (b)(2)(G); R. Michael Gadbaw & Michael T. Medwig, Multinational
Enterprises and International Labor Standards: Which Way for Development and
Jobs?, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 141, 148
(Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996).
133. Trade Act of 1947, 19 U.S.C. § 2467(4) (1999).
134. EC GSP Plus, supra note 25, art. 8.
135. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
136. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
137. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art.1(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
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the Right to Organise (No. 87)138 and the Convention Concerning the
Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and Bargain
Collectively (No. 98);139 and environmental conventions such as the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.140
Notably, the E.C. has maintained the linkage to combating illicit
drug trafficking, the same conditionality that was invalidated by the
AB,141 only cloaking it in the requirement that the beneficiary
country ratify and implement the United Nations Convention against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,142
United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances,143 and
United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.144
Taking a step back, this article recalls that India‘s original
argument at the inception of EC – Tariff Preferences was that GSP
was meant to apply to all developing countries in a fully
nondiscriminatory manner and that no conditionality was permitted
under the Enabling Clause.145 The Panel ruled in India‘s favor on
this point,146 but the Appellate Body curtailed the ruling to still allow
GSP conditionality so long as it responded positively to development
needs.147 While not ignoring the obvious economic motivation for
138. Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organise (No. 87), July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17 [hereinafter ILO
Convention No. 87].
139. Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98), Jan. 7,
1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 98].
140. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
141. See EC 2001 GSP, supra note 27, arts. 10, 25; AB Report, supra note 12, ¶
190(g).
142. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 82/16, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493
(1988) [hereinafter U.N. Convention Against Traffic in Drugs].
143. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 2, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019
U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Aug. 16, 1976).
144. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T.
1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1964) [hereinafter Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs].
145. Panel Report, supra note 30, ¶¶ 4.10–4.11, 4.28; Howse, India’s WTO
Challenge, supra note 14, at 387; Mason, supra note 30, at 528-29.
146. Panel Report, supra note 30, ¶ 7.116; Mason, supra note 30, at 531.
147. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 165; ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at
803-04; Mason, supra note 30, at 533–34; see also Howse, India’s WTO
Challenge, supra note 14, at 393-95.
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India‘s request for a panel,148 India‘s challenge points to a broader
criticism that GSP linkage has a trade-diverting effect whereby the
gain of one developing country is the economic loss of another
developing country.149 This may be an acceptable systemic cost that
results in a Pareto improvement if social justice objectives can be
achieved through GSP linkage, though it is worth observing that the
market experience with GSP and linkage has been something of a
mixed bag.150
Beyond that, however, it is not that simply any social justice
objective can be roped into the GSP scheme; rather, only those
conditions that ultimately advance a ―development need‖ are
permissible.151 Developing countries already faced challenges in
coordinating their side of the GSP bargain because of the complexity
and variability in GSP schemes.152 Without question, the vagaries of
GSP, driven not only by the lobby-motivated conditionality but also
through annual review and revision thereof,153 can frustrate even the
most sophisticated exporters in developing countries.154 Moreover,
they thwart the social goals that GSP linkage aims to achieve.155 To
add to this labyrinthine policy coordination obstacle course, the outer
bounds of ―development needs‖ remain an elusive mystery.156

148. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 147; Mason, supra note 30, at 515
(explaining that the E.C. scheme costs Indian exporters $300 million per year).
149. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 147. To crystallize this point, one can
imagine a scenario where $300 million of trade is shifted entirely from one
developing country to another. Contrast this with a scenario in which the $300
million is shared between the two developing countries. The two developing
countries would both take from this $300 million in preferential trade as they
together approached the ceiling or CNL of the preference granting country.
150. SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 16, at 252, 262; Compa & Vogt, supra note
17, at 237-38; TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 146-47.
151. ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 808.
152. Kolben, supra note 22, at 214-16; TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 147;
Lichtenbaum, supra note 10, at 1015-16.
153. SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 16, at 216-20.
154. Id.
155. See Compa & Vogt, supra note 17, at 237-38.
156. ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 808; Broude, supra note 13, at 252.
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C. THE NEXUS BETWEEN GSPS AND ―DEVELOPMENT NEEDS‖—
THE LINK IN LINKAGE
1. A Required Legal Reconciliation, even if not the Motivation, of
Linkage
In light of the legal standard that GSP linkage must advance
―development needs,‖ this article presents two brief clarifications as
to its argument. The first clarification is that while the nexus
between GSP and ―development needs‖ is a legal reconciliation
required under WTO law,157 by no means would advancement of
―development needs‖ have to be the motivation behind the GSP
linkage. Professor Petros Mavroidis points out that even in the wake
of EC – Tariff Preferences, ―[i]t is at best debatable whether the
donors have incentives to adopt criteria that will promote
development of the recipients and not simply their own social
preferences which might upset the prioritization of development
options for the recipients.‖158 This claim is not here disputed.159 But
to be clear, the constraint imposed under WTO law is that the linkage
must incentivize some undertaking by the beneficiary country that is
a ―development need.‖ In the words of the AB, ―a sufficient nexus
should exist between, on the one hand, the preferential treatment . . .
and, on the other hand, the likelihood of alleviating the relevant
‗development, financial [or] trade need.‘‖160 So long as the linkage
can be tied back to a relevant development need, however, the
original motivation of the linkage may come from any source.
2. Enabling the Enabling Clause to Serve Human Rights and Social
Goals
The second clarification is that this article offers a set of
parameters whereby human rights and social goals can be advanced
through a WTO mechanism, i.e., GSP linkage, and can be
legitimized under WTO law through the Enabling Clause.
157. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 164.
158. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 145.
159. See id. at 145 (noting diverging views which include the argument that
developed countries may adopt GSP conditions precisely to advance the
development of the recipient country).
160. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 164.
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Advocates have sought to use the powerful enforcement capabilities
of the WTO to promote social justice objectives in developing
countries, sometimes arguing that these objectives are permissible
under GATT Article XX‘s exceptions,161 and sometimes arguing for
outright social clause inclusions in the covered agreements.162 GSP
linkage is not only prevalent in the international trading
community,163 but is also regarded as a viable means of advancing
social justice objectives through a WTO mechanism.164 Thus social
justice advocates seeking to (a) advance human rights objectives not
presently covered through GSP linkage, or (b) defend existing
linkages, may promote and protect their laudable objectives by
preparing legal arguments demonstrating a nexus between the GSP
condition and an economic development need.
This article‘s goal is to begin an enumeration of WTO-consistent
―development needs‖ to help in the preparation of these arguments.
Thus, this article reviews the principal WTO AB Report articulating
a standard by which one may determine ―development needs,‖ and
presents other sources of WTO law that may be used to show that
these needs comport with the WTO framework.

II. SOURCES OF LAW FROM WHICH TO
DETERMINE ―DEVELOPMENT NEEDS‖
A. THE EC – TARIFF PREFERENCES APPELLATE BODY REPORT
In WTO Panel and Appellate Body decisions, the concept of
―development needs‖ has come up only twice in any level of
161. Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy—and Back Again: The Fate
of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT‘L L. 94, 102 (2002) (explaining
the challenges in arguing legality under the GATT of a U.S. trade embargo against
tuna fished in a manner that harmed dolphins and the problem of applying
domestic policy to import restrictions).
162. See Virginia Leary, The WTO and the Social Clause: Post-Singapore, 1
EUR. J. INT‘L L. 118, 118–19 (1997) (discussing negotiations over a social clause
from a historical perspective).
163. SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 16, at 234-35.
164. Market Access, supra note 128, at 71-72; Gadbaw & Medwig, supra note
132, at 148; see also Terry Collingsworth, International Worker Rights
Enforcement?, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
227, 229–33 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996).
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appreciable detail.165 In Brazil – Export Financing Programme for
Aircraft, the Panel found that ―it is the developing country Member
itself which is best positioned to identify its development needs.‖166
EC – Tariff Preferences was the principal case that articulated the
standard for discerning development needs and forms the starting
point for the analysis of such needs.167 This article will review the
arguments and holding in that case.
1. India’s Legal Challenge to the European Communities’ GSP
In December 2002, India questioned the legality of the GSP
adopted by the European Communities and, in particular, the tariff
preferences it granted to specified developing countries that
combated drug production and trafficking (―Drug Arrangements‖)
and that upheld labor and environmental standards determined by the
E.C. 168 India had been a beneficiary of preferential treatment from
the E.C. until the adoption of the E.C.‘s GSP scheme in December
2001.169 This scheme designated Pakistan as a recipient of a special
arrangement in exchange for combating drug production and
trafficking, but excluded India,170 and thus, the GSP threatened to put
Indian goods at a competitive disadvantage in the E.C. market.171
Additionally, it was not at all clear that the Drug Arrangements,
165. Broude, supra note 13, at 253 (noting that Brazil – Export and EC – Tariff
Preferences were the only instances in which the Panel or Appellate Body has
spoken to ―development needs‖).
166. Panel Report, Brazil–Export Financing Programme for Aircraft,
WT/DS46/R p. 104 (Apr. 14, 1999). The Appellate Body left the finding
unaddressed, speaking instead to the burden of proof issue regarding the developed
country that challenges a developing country‘s measure as inconsistent with its
development needs. Appellate Body Report, Brazil–Export Financing Programme
for Aircraft, ¶¶ 89-94 WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999); see also Broude, supra note
13, at 253.
167. Broude, supra note 13, at 253; TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 143-45.
168. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by India, European Communities–
Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries,
WT/DS246/4 (Dec. 9, 2002) [hereinafter India Panel Request].
169. EC 2001 GSP, supra note 27; see also AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 1.
170. EC 2001 GSP, supra note 27, at 15-17.
171. Anastasios Tomazos, The GSP Fallacy: A Critique of the Appellate Body’s
Ruling in the GSP Case on Legal, Economic, and Political/Systemic Grounds, in
WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 306, 307 (George A. Bermann & Petros
C. Mavroidis eds., 2007); TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 144.
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environmental protection requirement, or labor standards
specification bore any relation to the economic development needs of
LDCs.172 India challenged the E.C.‘s GSP in relation to Enabling
Clause paragraph 2(a), which authorizes GSP schemes, paragraph
3(a), which stipulates that GSPs must not create undue difficulties
for the trade of a contracting party that is not the recipient of the
preference, and paragraph 3(c), which requires that the GSP must be
designed ―to respond positively to the development, financial and
trade needs of developing countries.‖173
2. The Appellate Body’s Ruling
The AB first held that the ―object and purpose‖ of the Enabling
Clause was to promote the economic development of WTO Members
who were developing countries.174 While the GATT Article I:1
imposes the obligation of most-favored nation treatment upon all
WTO Members, the Enabling Clause operates as a legal exception to
that obligation.175 Furthermore, Members have an international legal
right within the WTO system to grant preferential treatment to
LDCs;176 indeed, developed Members are encouraged to provide this
preferential treatment.177 The AB noted that preferential treatment to
LDCs is facially inconsistent with the MFN obligation of GATT
Article I:1, but that the treatment can nonetheless be legally justified
by virtue of the Enabling Clause.178 Thus, in order for preferential
treatment to be legal under the WTO, the treatment must comply
with the Enabling Clause‘s requirements.179

172. Robert Howse, Back to Court After Shrimp/Turtle? Almost but not Quite
Yet: India’s Short Lived Challenge to Labor and Environmental Exceptions in the
European Union’s Generalized System of Preferences, 18 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV.
1333, 1339-40 (2003).
173. India Panel Request, supra note 168; AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 2-4. At
a later point, India dropped the challenges to the environmental and labor
standards, pursuing only the challenge to the Drug Arrangements. AB Report,
supra note 12, ¶ 4.
174. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 92.
175. Id. ¶¶ 90, 98-99.
176. Id. ¶¶ 101-02.
177. Id. ¶ 111.
178. Id. ¶¶ 101-02.
179. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 111-12.
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3. The Standard for Compliance with the Enabling Clause
The Appellate Body articulated four substantive requirements for
compliance with the Enabling Clause.180 First, the preferences must
not impair Members‘ ability to uphold their otherwise-applicable
MFN obligations.181 Second, the treatment must not ―raise barriers to
or create undue difficulty for‖ the trade of a non-recipient
Member.182 Third, the preferential treatment must be ―generalized,
non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory.‖183 Finally, the preferential
treatment must ―respond positively to the development, financial and
trade needs of developing countries.‖184 The Appellate Body did not
elaborate upon the first of these requirements, stemming from
paragraph 3(b) of the Enabling Clause. As to the second, arising
from paragraph 3(a) of the Enabling Clause, the Appellate Body
stated that the preferential treatment to LDCs must ―not impose
unjustifiable burdens on other Members.‖185 Ultimately finding the
Drug Arrangements in the E.C.‘s GSP to be inconsistent with the
Enabling Clause because this GSP linkage was discriminatory,186 the
AB explored the remaining two standards in depth.
a. Generalized, Non-Discriminatory, and Non-Reciprocal
Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause allows for GSP schemes,
but footnote 3 to this paragraph imposes the legal obligation that the
GSP scheme be ―generalized, non-reciprocal and nondiscriminatory.‖187 The term ―generalized‖ requires that ―the GSP
schemes of preference-granting countries remain generally

180. Id. ¶ 112. This article presents the requirements articulated in ¶ 112 of the
AB Report in slightly different order than that in the AB Report for convenience of
presentation.
181. Id. ¶ 112; Enabling Clause, supra note 10, ¶ 3(b).
182. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 112; Enabling Clause, supra note 10, ¶ 3(a).
183. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 112; Enabling Clause, supra note 10, ¶ 2(a),
n.3.
184. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 112; Enabling Clause, supra note 10, ¶ 3(c).
185. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 167, 179.
186. Id. ¶¶ 187-89.
187. Id. ¶¶ 112, 131, 145 (stating that ―only preferential tariff treatment that is in
conformity with the description ‗generalized, non-reciprocal and nondiscriminatory‘ treatment can be justified under paragraph 2(a)‖).
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applicable.‖188 The Appellate Body did not elaborate on the term
―non-reciprocal,‖ but in line with other provisions within the GATT,
non-reciprocal can be interpreted to mean that ―the developed
contracting parties do not expect reciprocity for commitments made
by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other
barriers to the trade of less-developed contracting parties.‖189 LDCs
should not be required to give trade preferences to developed
countries in exchange for treatment under GSP schemes.190 Finally,
the term ―non-discriminatory‖ means that, while different treatment
may be granted to different LDCs or groups of LDCs,191 in light of
paragraph 3(c), the recipient LDCs must share a development need
and any LDC that has the same development need must be able to
avail itself of the GSP treatment.192
b. Paragraph 3(c): Development, Financial, and Trade Needs
The remaining legal obligation of the Enabling Clause is the one
stemming from paragraph 3(c), the requirement that any preferential
treatment ―be designed, and, if necessary, modified, to respond
positively to the development, financial and trade needs of
developing countries.‖193 While the Panel made no finding as to the
consistency of the Drug Arrangements with paragraph 3(c), the
Appellate Body elaborated upon this standard for purposes of
determining the nature of the requirement that the E.C.‘s GSP
scheme be non-discriminatory.194
Because the object and purpose of the Enabling Clause is to
promote economic development, the ―development needs‖ falling
under paragraph 3(c) must similarly be needs of economic
development.195 Preferential treatment responds positively to these
needs if it has the effect of ―improving the development, financial or
188. Id. ¶ 156.
189. GATT art. XXXVI(8); TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 141.
190. See TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 141.
191. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 159.
192. Id. ¶¶ 157, 159-62, 165.
193. Enabling Clause, supra note 10, ¶ 3(c); see also AB Report, supra note 12,
¶¶ 112, 158.
194. See AB Report, supra note 12,¶¶ 130, 133, 157.
195. Id. ¶¶ 92, 160.
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trade situation of a beneficiary country, based on the particular need
at issue.‖196 A need does not qualify as a development need simply
because it is identified this way by the preference-granting Member
or beneficiary.197 By contrast, ―the existence of a ‗development,
financial [or] trade need‘ must be assessed according to an objective
standard,‖198 whereby qualifying development needs are those that
are ―widely-recognized.‖199 In order to determine these development
needs, the AB directs WTO Members to look to ―broad-based
recognition of a particular need, set out in the WTO Agreement or in
multilateral instruments adopted by international organizations.‖200
The Appellate Body did not address key areas of the definition of
―development needs‖ necessary to be workable guidance: what
specifically qualifies as valid, widely-recognized economic
development needs and which multilateral instruments were suitable
for use in determining broad-based recognition.

B. BEYOND EC – TARIFF PREFERENCES: SOURCES OF WTO LAW
While heavily persuasive, WTO Panel and Appellate Body reports
are not strictly a source of WTO Members‘ rights and obligations;
rather, these rights and obligations derive from the agreements listed
in Appendix 1 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (―DSU‖, and such agreements,
the ―Covered Agreements‖) and interpretative elements.201 The
WTO is best understood as a creation of international contract,
whereby principles of applicable law are selectively chosen and
given relevance in the Covered Agreements.202 Some principles of
international custom may not find their way into the WTO, while
196. Id. ¶ 164 (emphasis in original).
197. Id. ¶ 163.
198. Id. ¶ 163 (emphasis in original).
199. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 179.
200. Id. ¶ 163.
201. MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW,
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 23 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter Matsushita et al.]; see, e.g.,
Petros C. Mavroidis, No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practiced by WTO
Courts, 102 AM. J. INT‘L L. 421, 426 (2008) [hereinafter Mavroidis] (listing
various interpretive elements including GATT panel reports, decisions by
international courts, and customary international law).
202. Matsushita et al., supra note 201, at 22-23.
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other binding principles, for instance, the treatment of the mostfavored nation principle in WTO law and Members‘ practice, may
apply in the WTO even though they do not enjoy sufficient
widespread state practice and supporting opinio juris to give them
the status of custom.203 However, the WTO Agreement is not an
exhaustive, self-contained treaty creating a completely isolated
institution, but rather, is best thought of as an incomplete contract.204
As a result, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism must
determine the rights and obligations of Members with occasional
reference to elements of international law outside of the WTO
system.205 These and other sources that have aided the dispute
settlement bodies in understanding the precise meaning and scope of
the rights and obligations under WTO law constitute the
interpretative elements in WTO adjudication.206
While the
fundamental rights and obligations are codified in the WTO
Agreement, the interpretation of its provisions often involves
recourse to external sources, within limits.207 The outer bound of
what is applicable to interpreting Member States‘ rights and
obligations is set forth in Article 3(2) of the DSU.208 Specifically,
this provides that the Dispute Settlement Body (―DSB‖) must
interpret Member States‘ rights and obligations ―in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.‖209
These interpretative elements thus do not create additional rights and
obligations upon Members under WTO law, nor can the rights and
obligations embodied in non-WTO multilateral agreements be

203. Matsushita et al., supra note 201, at 23; see also Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 184-89 (June 27) (describing
widespread state practice and supporting opinio juris as the elements of customary
international law).
204. Matsushita et al., supra note 201, at 23.
205. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 163; see also Mavroidis, supra note 201, at
450-51.
206. Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 426.
207. Id. at 426.
208. Id.
209. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 3.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]; see also
Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 426.
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enforced through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.210
Instead, these outside sources are means of determining the nature of
rights and obligations that derive from sources within the WTO
Covered Agreements.211
1. Sources of Rights and Obligations under WTO Law
The underlying rights and obligations of WTO Member States are
found exclusively in the Covered Agreements.212 Beginning with the
WTO Agreement itself, Appendix 1 of the DSU goes on to list the
agreements mentioned in the Annexes of the WTO Agreement.213 In
addition to these agreements-proper, there are international
agreements that are incorporated into the Covered Agreements and
also give rise to rights and obligations for WTO Member States.214
Of specific relevance to this discussion are decisions adopted by
GATT Contracting Parties prior to the WTO; these are specifically
incorporated into the WTO Agreement by Article XVI.1.215 In
particular, the Enabling Clause is a decision of the GATT
Contracting Parties.216 The Appellate Body specifically recognized
the Enabling Clause as among the Covered Agreements, providing
rights to developed countries to offer trade preferences and a
corresponding obligation ―to establish in dispute settlement the
consistency of their preferential measures with the conditions of the
Enabling Clause.‖217
2. Interpretative Elements to Determine Contours of WTO Rights
and Obligations
The requirement that rights and obligations of WTO Member
States must be carried out in accordance with ―the customary rules of
210. DSU, supra note 209, art. 3.2; Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 426.
211. Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 425.
212. DSU, supra note 209, art. 3.2 ( stating that ― Members recognize that [the
dispute settlement system of the WTO] serves to preserve the rights and
obligations of Members under the covered agreements . . .‖); Mavroidis, supra
note 201, at 427.
213. DSU, supra note 209, art. 1; WTO Agreement app. 1.
214. Matsushita et al., supra note 201, at 25.
215. GATT art. XVI(1).
216. Enabling Clause, supra note 10, pmbl.
217. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 98.
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interpretation of public international law‖218 has been found to
include the General Rule of Interpretation embodied in Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.219 This includes,
among other things, that rights and obligations under a treaty must be
interpreted based on the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty
itself in their context,220 in light of the treaty‘s object and purpose,221
and with regard to subsequent agreements and state practice on the
same subject matter.222 In EC – Tariff Preferences, the Appellate
Body looked to the preamble of the WTO Agreement to determine
the instrument‘s object and purpose.223 This is consistent with Panel
and AB reports that have looked to the GATT‘s preamble, with the
limitation on teleological interpretation that it must be mindful of the
ends sought by the treaty as well as the means to achieving the
ends.224 As to subsequent state practice, the weight of authority is
that only unanimous practice by all WTO Member States qualifies as
an interpretative element.225
As with the International Court of Justice (―ICJ‖),226 there is no
rule of stare decisis in the WTO dispute settlement system, and no
WTO Panel or Appellate Body is formally bound by past reports.227
However, also like the ICJ,228 WTO dispute settlement entities look
218. DSU, supra note 209, art. 3(2).
219. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, ¶ 1, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see also Appellate Body Report,
United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline 15,
WT/DS2/AB/R (May 20, 1996) [hereinafter U.S. – Gasoline] (quoting a previous
panel report on a WTO case to interpret key language); Mavroidis, supra note 202,
at 444; Jan Bohanes & Nicolas Lockhart, Standard of Review in WTO Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 378, 387 (Daniel Bethlehem
et al. eds., 2009).
220. Vienna Convention, supra note 219, art. 31(1).
221. Vienna Convention, supra note 219, art. 31(1).
222. Vienna Convention, supra note 219, art. 31(3); see also Mavroidis, supra
note 201, at 444.
223. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 91-92.
224. Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 452.
225. Id. at 453.
226. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1153, 1179 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
227. Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 464.
228. See Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 13,
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Nov. 1, 1996) [hereinafter
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to past DSB reports as an interpretative element.229 The Appellate
Body, in U.S. – Shrimp (Article 21.5–Malaysia), affirmed that past
DSB reports are relevant to a Panel or Appellate Body ―as a tool for
its own reasoning.‖230 The Panel in India – Patents (EC) stated that
while Panels are not bound by previous panel or Appellate Body
decisions, they will take into account the conclusions and reasoning
of past decisions because of the DSU‘s goal of providing
predictability to the multilateral trading system and avoiding
inconsistent DSB rulings.231
The WTO AB and Panels have, when necessary, looked to
agreements outside of the WTO-proper in interpreting the standards
of WTO law.232 The Appellate Body in U.S. – Shrimp sought
recourse to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species233 to determine whether the species of sea turtles in question
fell within the meaning of the term ―exhaustible natural resources‖ as
it appears in GATT Article XX(g).234 In a later stage of the same
dispute, the Appellate Body used non-WTO international agreements
to ascertain evidence of practice that may or may not be consistent
with obligations arising from a Covered Agreement.235 In yet
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages] (―[ICJ Statute Article 59] has not inhibited the
development by that Court (and its predecessor) of a body of case law in which
considerable reliance on the value of previous decisions is readily discernible.‖);
see also Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 464.
229. Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 464.
230. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse by Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶
109, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Nov. 21, 2001) [hereinafter U.S. – Shrimp (Article 21.5–
Malaysia)]; see also Mavroidis, supra note 202, at 464.
231. Panel Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, ¶ 7.30, WT/DS79/R (Sept. 22, 1998); see also
Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 465-66; Bohanes & Lockhart, supra note 219, at
382.
232. See Mavroidis, supra note 202, at 468.
233. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, 12 I.L.M. 1085
(1973).
234. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 132, WT/DS58/AB/R (Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter
U.S. – Shrimp]; Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 468-69.
235. U.S. – Shrimp (Article 21.5–Malaysia), supra note 235, ¶ 124 (finding that,
by reference to multilateral environmental agreements, ―a multilateral approach is
strongly preferred. Yet it is one thing to prefer a multilateral approach in the
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another dispute, the Appellate Body sought recourse to multilateral
instruments in order to ascertain a factual state of affairs.236
Additionally, the Appellate Body in EC – Tariff Preferences
indicated that ―the existence of ‗development, financial [or] trade
need‘ must be assessed according to an objective standard‖237 and
that ―[b]road based recognition of a particular need, set out in the
WTO Agreement or in multilateral instruments adopted by
international organizations, could serve as such a standard.‖238
Finally, multilateral instruments are important to finding the
living, dynamic meaning of treaty terms ―in light of contemporary
concerns of the community of nations.‖239 Treaty terms written
decades ago must be interpreted in the light of the treaty‘s object and
purpose, but that same object and purpose can contemplate a longterm vision so that the substantive nature of terms and their
definitions can grow and evolve with time.240 The same can be said
about ―development needs,‖ and, consequently, the Appellate Body
opened the door to multilateral instruments as the basis for the
objective standard to determine the evolving content of this term.241

C. SYNTHESIS: A LIVING, EVOLVING STANDARD FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT NEEDS
The Appellate Body elucidated that development needs must be
economic in nature, in light of the Enabling Clause‘s object and
purpose, and that a goal may qualify as a ―development need‖ by
reference to the Covered Agreements and other multilateral

application of a measure that is provisionally justified under one of the
subparagraphs of Article XX of the GATT 1994; it is another to require the
conclusion of a multilateral agreement as a condition of avoiding ―arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination‖ under the chapeau of Article XX.‖) (emphasis in
original); see also Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 468.
236. Appellate Body Report, EC–Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, ¶¶ 114, 135, WT/DS135/AB/R (Apr. 5, 2001) [hereinafter
EC – Measures]; see also Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 469.
237. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 163 (emphasis in original).
238. Id.
239. U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 234, ¶ 129.
240. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 160, 169; see also U.S. – Shrimp, supra note
234, ¶¶ 129, 131.
241. See id. ¶ 163.
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instruments. A textual basis in a specific article from a Covered
Agreement delineating a WTO Member‘s right or obligation
provides perhaps the strongest basis in law for a goal to be deemed a
―development need,‖ but in the view of the AB, ―development
needs‖ may also take on a living, evolving character through
interpretative elements outside of the Covered Agreements. As other
multilateral instruments and other interpretative elements have
served as sources by which to understand WTO Members‘ rights and
obligations in the past, they are equally valid in the analysis of
―development needs.‖ In light of the above sources of law, and as
further informed by the practice of WTO Members, this article
proceeds to delineate specific ―development needs.‖

III.ANALYSIS OF ―DEVELOPMENT, FINANCIAL,
AND TRADE NEEDS‖
A. RELEVANT ATTRIBUTES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
To begin, the term ―economic development‖ is itself seldom
defined in economics discourse. When a definition of the term is
proffered, economists, scholars, and policymakers tend to include
macroeconomic growth,242 wealth creation and increased per capita
income,243 industrialization and production of higher-quality or more
sophisticated goods,244 and sustainability245 as attributes of economic
development.
Professor Alan Deardorff specifically defines
―economic development‖ to mean the ―[s]ustained increase in the
economic standard of living of a country‘s population, normally
accomplished by increasing its stocks of physical and human capital
and improving its technology.‖246 Professor Gerald Meier defined it
as ―the process whereby the real per capita income of a country
increases over a long period of time—subject to the stipulations that
242. JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES M. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 31 (3d ed. 2009) (1997).
243. Id. at 31.
244. Id.; EDWARD J. BLAKELY & NANCEY GREEN LEIGH, PLANNING LOCAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 84 (4th ed. 2010).
245. Douglas Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic
Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1, 22–28 (2001).
246. ALAN V. DEARDORFF, TERMS OF TRADE: GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS 79 (2006) (emphasis in original).
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the number below an ‗absolute poverty line‘ does not increase, and
that the distribution of income does not become more unequal.‖247
This article makes the extension that a ―development need,‖
something needed to attain economic development, can consequently
be defined as an undertaking, process, input, objective, or policy
required to achieve one or several goals of economic development.248
From this starting point, this article proceeds to argue that
macroeconomic growth, poverty reduction, sustainability, and
education are ―development needs‖ consistent with the WTO legal
framework.249
247. Gerald M. Meier, Objectives of Development–Note, in LEADING ISSUES IN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 5, 5-6 (4th ed. 1984).
248. The definition proffered herein is simply based on parsing the phrase
―development needs‖ into ―things needed for development.‖ The specific
contributors to economic development articulated herein, not meant to be an
exhaustive list, are based on economics discourse. For instance, as undertakings or
processes that contribute to economic development, economists have included
improving technology or techniques of production, John P. Lewis, Development
Promotion: A Time for Regrouping, in DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES RECONSIDERED
3, 9–10 (John P. Lewis & Valeriana Kallab eds., 1986); Meier, supra note 247, at
6, and improved infrastructure, M.K. Datar, Development Banking: Is it the End?,
in CHALLENGES TO INDIAN BANKING: COMPETITION, GLOBALISATION AND
FINANCIAL MARKETS 229, 231 (Narendra Jadhav ed., 1996). Development
economists have identified labor productivity, ALAN S. BLINDER, GROWING
TOGETHER 50–67 (1991), and the availability of financing/credit, Datar,
Development Banking, supra note 249, at 231, as inputs that contribute to
economic development. An objective of economic development could include,
simply, an economic growth target, for instance through increased productive
output or new industries. Meier, supra note 247, at 6. A policy of poverty
reduction to increase disposable income has been identified as contributing to
economic development as distinguished from simply economic growth. Meier,
supra note 247, at 7-8; Irma Adelman, A Poverty-Focused Approach to
Development Policy, in DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES RECONSIDERED 49, 54-56
(John P. Lewis & Valeriana Kallab eds., 1986); Montek S. Ahluwalia, Income
Inequality: Some Dimensions of the Problem, in REDISTRIBUTION WITH GROWTH 3,
3 (Hollis Chenery et al. eds., 1974). This article‘s goal is to take certain
contributors to economic development that are well-recognized in the economics
discourse and reconcile these contributors with WTO legal text and interpretative
elements.
249. This article focuses on these four development needs, again meant to be
indicative rather than exhaustive. Additionally, this article notes that these needs
relate to actions that the government of the developing country can choose to
engage in. There is a separate category of needs that are based on the
circumstances in which a developing country finds itself, for instance, a low
literacy rate, or even more separated from social factors, low access to rainfall
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B. THE ―DEVELOPMENT NEEDS‖ CONSISTENT WITH WTO LAW
1. Macroeconomic Growth as a Development Need
The initial impetus for creating the GATT, and an objective
maintained as the GATT transformed into the WTO,250 was to further
the goal of providing Contracting Parties with access to one
another‘s markets.251 This access was to be provided through trade
market liberalization, taking down barriers to trade, and eliminating
discriminatory treatment.252 The goal of providing market access
remained a motivation of later trade negotiation rounds addressing
non-tariff barriers and voluntary export restraints.253 While market
access, as a goal of developed countries, serves the goal of economic
growth for already-established economic powers,254 the evolution of
the GATT as it progressed towards the WTO saw a greater voice for
developing countries and their concerns of market access.255 Having
accepted to a sufficient degree that trade liberalization can lead to
economic growth,256 developing countries advocated enhanced
flexibility to export their economically significant goods to
developed markets.257
Correspondingly, developed countries
giving rise to economic challenges. The latter category of needs may constitute
needs for assistance, but not factors or undertakings necessary to achieve economic
development. The factors or undertakings necessary for economic development,
including policy undertakings, are the focus of this article‘s definition of the
―development needs‖ which this article argues can be the subject of GSP
conditionality.
250. WTO Agreement art. II.1, Annex I.
251. Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1,
10 (2005); see also Market Access, supra note 128, at 59; see also KOUL, supra
note 53, at 9.
252. GATT pmbl.
253. KOUL, supra note 52, at 19, 23-24.
254. Id. at 20-21.
255. Id.
256. Edwini Kessie, The Legal Status of Special and Differential Treatment
Provisions under the WTO Agreements, in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 12, 19 (George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2007); KOUL,
supra note 52, at 569.
257. Kessie, supra note 256, at 21. Kessie notes that at the time of the Uruguay
Round, developing countries were willing to accept a dilution of special and
differential treatment in exchange for greater market access and stricter rules. Id.
at 20. In light of subsequent experience, the majority of developing countries now
view special and differential treatment as having had a favorable effect on their
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undertook to protect the interests of developing countries when the
GATT was assumed into the WTO Agreement and as the WTO
Agreement later evolved.258
From the decisions of GATT Contracting Parties leading up to the
WTO and in the WTO Agreement itself, macroeconomic growth,
and in particular that of developing countries, has been a founding
principle and recognized goal of the international trading system.259
The GATT Preamble expresses the agreement‘s goal of ―expanding
the production and exchange of goods.‖260 The WTO broadens this
to enshrine the goal of ―expanding the production of and trade in
goods and services.‖261 The ―cornerstone principle‖ of MFN
treatment is itself most fundamentally aimed at advancing mutual
market access.262 In the development of S&DT, the original decision
of the GATT Contracting Parties that allowed for GSPs, the Waiver
Decision on the Generalized System of Preferences,263 affirms that ―a
principal aim of the CONTRACTING PARTIES is promotion of the trade
and export earnings of developing countries for the furtherance of
their economic development.‖264 This was to be achieved in a
collaborative manner between developed and developing
countries,265 and in light of the development need to achieve
macroeconomic growth, this article submits that measures promoting
the goal of increased market access advance a ―development need‖
that is consistent with the WTO legal regime.266
economic development. Id. at 34.
258. Kessie, supra note 256, at 27-30.
259. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 110; see also Broude, supra note 13, at 236.
260. GATT pmbl.
261. WTO Agreement pmbl.; AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 161, 168.
262. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 101; Sam Laird, Multilateral Approaches to
Market Access Negotiations, in TRADE RULES IN THE MAKING: CHALLENGES IN
REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 205, 205 (Miguel Rodríguez
Mendoza et al. eds., 1999); TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 122.
263. GATT Document L/3545, June 25, 1971, GATT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at
24 [hereinafter Waiver Decision].
264. Waiver Decision, supra note 263, pmbl.; see also AB Report, supra note
12, ¶ 92.
265. See GATT art. XXXVI:1(d).
266. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 107; see also WILLIAM R. CLINE, TRADE
POLICY AND GLOBAL POVERTY 41–42 (2004) (pointing to empirical economic
evidence indicating that export growth is associated with increased growth in
GDP).
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2. Raising Standards of Living as a Development Need
Based on sources of international law both within the WTO
system and from other multilateral treaties, this article proceeds to
argue that the goal of raising standards of living is equally as widelyrecognized as a need of developing countries. Economic theory,
outside of the context of international and WTO law-proper, has
consistently championed poverty reduction as a bedrock goal of
economic development.267 Furthermore, the practice of states and
international institutions has borne out this development goal in both
domestic and international settings.268 This article submits that
poverty reduction is a development need in line with the WTO goal
of raising living standards, and presents both the economic and legal
bases for this submission.
Of the four development needs discussed herein, poverty reduction
may be the most challenging to argue as falling within the WTO‘s
contemplation. It is consistent with the construction of the WTO to
say that the WTO legal framework contemplates the objective of
raising living standards.269 In order to proceed and argue that this
implies and includes poverty reduction, however, this article
analyzes this development need from the perspectives of
international law and economics. This article‘s assertion that poverty
267. Montek S. Ahluwalia & Hollis Chenery, The Economic Framework, in
REDISTRIBUTION WITH GROWTH 38, 38–39 (Hollis Chenery et al. eds., 1974);
Montek S. Ahluwalia, The Scope for Policy Intervention, in REDISTRIBUTION WITH
GROWTH 73, 73 (Hollis Chenery et al. eds., 1974); Meier, supra note 247, at 7; see
also Cline, supra note 266, at 28 (stating that ―sustained economic growth in
developing countries is essential to the reduction of global poverty‖).
268. With regard to the practice of states, see, for example, Maurizio Bussolo et
al., Structural Change and Poverty Reduction in Brazil: The Impact of the Doha
Round, in POVERTY AND THE WTO: IMPACTS OF THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA 249, 250–53 (Thomas W. Hertel & L. Alan Winters eds., 2006)
(examining the impact of trade on the reduction of poverty in the Brazilian
agricultural sector). In regard to the practice of international institutions, see, for
example, James D. Wolfensohn, A Partnership for Development and Peace, in A
CASE FOR AID: BUILDING A CONSENSUS FOR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 3, 7-8
(World Bank 2002); Frank J. Garcia, Justice, the Bretton Woods Institutions, and
the Problem of Inequality, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL
SYSTEM 475, 493-95 (Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009) (outlining
several World Bank initiatives aimed at ―reduc[ing] poverty while improving
health, education, and the environment‖).
269. See infra notes 288-322 and accompanying text.
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reduction is a ―development need‖ should not be taken as an
argument that the WTO as an institution should positively channel its
machinery towards the goal of poverty reduction. Rather, this article
submits that if a developed Member were to promote, or incentivize
developing countries to take steps towards this goal, or provide trade
preferences that responded positively to this need among developing
countries, the developed Member would be within its rights to offer
preferential treatment so designed.270
a. Poverty Reduction: Analysis in International Economics
From the definitions of economic development presented above,271
the sub-goals of poverty reduction and income redistribution emerge
as essential to economic development as distinguished from solely
broad-based economic growth.272
In addition to overall
macroeconomic growth, the distribution of the returns from that
growth is jointly a goal of economic development.273 In the presentday formulation, economic development is viewed to be
inadequately achieved if the returns accrue only to the select few and
the impoverished remain without those returns.274 For instance, an
economy that includes both an indigenous or agricultural sector and a
modern, industrial, or service sector may experience aggregate
growth with all of the returns accruing to the modern sector; this is
an inequitable distribution and does not satisfy the requirement of
economic development even if it registers as macroeconomic
growth.275
Poverty reduction is a goal of economic development as widely
recognized as increasing overall macroeconomic production.276
Moreover, just as economic development aims to reduce poverty,
270. See supra Part I.C.1.
271. See supra Part III.A.
272. Meier, supra note 247, at 6-7.
273. Ahluwalia & Chenery, Economic Framework, supra note 267, at 38-39.
274. Wolfensohn, supra note 268, at 7-8.
275. Meier, supra note 247, at 7.
276. PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS:
THEORY AND POLICY 602-03 (7th ed. 2005); Meier, supra note 247, at 7; S.
Vasudeva Shetty, Re-inventing Rural Banking, in CHALLENGES TO INDIAN
BANKING: COMPETITION, GLOBALISATION AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 61, 74–75
(Narendra Jadhav ed., 2d ed. 1996).
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poverty reduction depends on economic growth.277 In order for
poverty reduction to accrue from macroeconomic growth, there must
be mechanisms for distributing national income evenly across socioeconomic sectors of the population.278 Thus, income redistribution
has taken its place as a fundamental and essential component of
successful economic development.279
Increased per-capita income alone does not reflect income
distribution; by contrast, empirical economic analysis indicates a
greater level of inequality between the wealthy and poor of the world
despite increases in per-capita income. As an illustration, the World
Bank‘s measure of poverty in developing and transition economies,
the percentage of the population living below $1 per day, fell from
28.3 percent in 1987 to 24.0 percent in 1998.280 World Bank survey
data indicate that for every 1 percent increase in per-capita income,
the poverty measure should fall by 2 percent if income is distributed
according to expectations.281 With real per-capita income growth in
the developing and transition economies averaging 2 percent
annually between 1987 and 1998, the poverty measure should have
fallen to as low as 18.4 percent by 1998.282 This disparity between
the expected and actual results can be explained, in part, by increased
inequality in the distribution of the gains from economic growth that
was seen in relatively higher-poverty economies including Brazil,
China, Indonesia, Mexico, and Nigeria.283
277. Cline, supra note 266, at 27. The proposition in this context, that
economic growth is essential to poverty reduction, begs the related question of
whether international trade leads to economic growth. While outside of the scope
of this article, Cline observes that data indicates a causal relationship between
international trade and economic growth. Id. at 40-42, 45.
278. Ahluwalia, supra note 267, at 73; see also Cline, supra note 266, at 28.
279. See, e.g., Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Dual Income Taxation: A
Potentially Promising Approach to Tax Reform in Developing Countries, 1
COLUM. J. TAX L. 151, 214–15 (2010) (arguing for a progressive tax scheme in
developing countries to promote sustained growth by redistributing income and
reducing inequality in the distribution of gains from economic growth).
280. Cline, supra note 266, at 28.
281. Id. at 27.
282. Id. at 28-29.
283. Id. at 29, 35. The author mentions potential World Bank data inadequacies
and a series of studies indicating that the reduction in poverty was greater than the
data captured. While agreeing that the status of poverty may be more optimistic
than the World Bank‘s study alone indicates there is still an amount of poverty that
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This article makes the extension, based on this economic theory
and practice, that poverty reduction is a natural corollary to the goal
of raising living standards, and recalls that in economic practice, this
has taken place through domestic income redistributive measures.284
Income redistribution allows for improvements in the standard of
living on a national level across the wealth spectrum of the nation‘s
population.285 Moreover, as this article argues below with regard to
agreements between the WTO and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (―World Bank‖), this extension is
not inconsistent with the WTO Agreement:286 the World Bank‘s
goals in practice have gone as far as to actively promote income
redistribution to alleviate poverty.287 This article submits that
domestic or international measures that raise living standards and
reduce poverty by redistributing national income thus advance an
internationally-recognized development need. And as this article
proceeds to argue, such measures advance a ―development need‖ that
is consistent with WTO law.
b. Poverty Reduction: Analysis in International Law
Alongside promoting increased national income through
macroeconomic growth, a sibling goal in the WTO legal order is to
improve the living standards of individuals within a Member State.288
The AB cites, in relation to S&DT adopted pursuant to the Enabling
Clause, Paragraph 7 of that instrument.289 Paragraph 7 of the
should have disappeared. Id. at 29-31. Income inequality remains an independent
explanation even correcting for potential data inadequacies. Id. at 33.
284. SEE GORDON TULLOCK, ECONOMICS OF INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 1-3
(1983) (pointing to income redistributive measures to benefit the poor while
acknowledging that, more generally, a greater proportion of redistributive
measures in the U.S. historically has been a manifestation of influential groups
exerting established political clout).
285. Enrique R. Carrasco & M. Ayhan Kose, Income Distribution and the
Bretton Woods Institutions: Promoting an Enabling Environment for Social
Development, 6 TRANSNAT‘L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3-4 (1996).
286. See WTO Agreement art. III.5 (drawing a connection between the WTO
and World Bank); see also Gardner, supra note 8, at 67 (noting the World Bank‘s
contributions to international development).
287. Carrasco & Kose, supra note 285, at 41.
288. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 107; see also GATT art. XXXVI:1(a), (d).
289. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 168; see also id. ¶ 161 (observing that ―the
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Enabling Clause expressly states:
The concessions and contributions made and the obligations assumed by
developed and less-developed contracting parties under the provisions of
the [GATT] should promote the basic objectives of the [GATT], including
those embodied in the Preamble and in Article XXXVI.290

This article thus begins with a review of the GATT
Preamble and Article XXXVI.
The goal of raising living standards is stated in the preamble of the
GATT,291 and the WTO Agreement carries this goal forward,
augmenting it to include a ―steadily growing volume of real income
and effective demand.‖292 Both the GATT and WTO Agreement
additionally include the goal of ―ensuring full employment‖ as a
founding principle.293 Moreover, the decisions of the Panel and AB
have reaffirmed the goal of raising living standards as part of the
WTO legal order. As recently as 2008, the Panel in India –
Additional and Extra-Additional Duties bolstered its interpretation of
GATT Article II:1(b) by observing the consistency of its
interpretation with the object and purpose of the GATT.294 In
particular, it cited the goals of ―raising standards of living‖ and
―expanding the production and exchange of goods‖ as integral to the
GATT‘s object and purpose.295
The goal of raising living standards is also enshrined in the text of
GATT Article XXXVI, a provision that appears in Part IV of the
GATT (Trade and Development).296 Part IV of the GATT contains

Preamble to the WTO Agreement . . . informs all the covered agreements including
the GATT 1994 (and, hence, the Enabling Clause)‖).
290. Enabling Clause, supra note 10, ¶ 7; see also Gregory O. Lunt, Note,
Graduation and the GATT: The Problem of the NICs, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L
L. 611, 618 n.44 (1994).
291. GATT pmbl.
292. WTO Agreement pmbl.
293. GATT pmbl.; WTO Agreement pmbl.; see also AB Report, supra note 12,
¶ 161.
294. Panel Report, India – Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports
from the United States, ¶ 7.142, WT/DS360/1 (June 9, 2008) [hereinafter India –
Additional Duties on Imports].
295. India – Additional Duties on Imports, supra note 294.
296. GATT art. XXXVI:1(a).
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three provisions: Article XXXVI sets forth the objectives that will
guide developed members in their trade relations and negotiations
with less-developed members; Article XXXVII contains
commitments to further these objectives; and Article XXXVIII calls
on Contracting Parties to take joint action in furtherance of Article
XXXVI‘s objectives.297 The commitments contained in Article
XXXVII have been described as undertakings by developed
countries to engage in their ―best endeavor‖ and, hence, are nonbinding in nature.298 But by virtue of Articles XXXVI and XXXVII,
the Contracting Parties have agreed that when developed contracting
parties engage in activities pursuant to the commitments in Article
XXXVII:1, they do so in furtherance of the objectives contained in
Article XXXVI.299
By way of express reference, Article
XXXVII:2(b)(i) provides that if ―effect is not being given to any of
the provisions of subparagraph (a), (b) or (c) of [Article
XXXVII:1] . . . [t]he CONTRACTING PARTIES shall, if requested so to
do by any interested contracting party . . . consult with the
contracting party concerned and all interested contracting parties
with respect to the matter and with a view to reaching solutions
satisfactory to all contracting parties concerned in order to further the
objectives set forth in Article XXXVI.‖300 Article XXXVIII further
provides that ―[t]he contracting parties shall collaborate jointly, with
the framework of this Agreement and elsewhere as appropriate, to
further the objectives set forth in Article XXXVI.‖301
The very first objective articulated in Article XXXVI:1 is ―the
raising of standards of living,‖302 an objective to be ―give[n] effect‖
through the ―adoption of measures‖ as a matter of ―conscious and
purposeful effort on the part of the contracting parties both

297. GATT arts. XXXVI–XXXVIII; Uché Ewelukwa, Special and Differential
Treatment in International Trade Law: A Concept in Search of Content, 29 N.D. L.
REV. 831, 846–47 (2003).
298. Frank J. Garcia, Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 27 B.C. INT‘L
& COMP. L. REV. 291, 311 (2004); see also Ewelukwa, supra note 297, at 847.
299. GATT arts. XXXVI, XXXVII; Ewelukwa, supra note 297, at 846–47.
300. GATT art. XXXVII:2(b)(i).
301. GATT art. XXXVIII; M. Richard Komins, Technical Analysis of the Group
―Framework‖, 12 LAW & POL‘Y INT‘L BUS. 299, 310 (1980).
302. GATT art. XXXVI:1(a).
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individually and jointly.‖303 The Contracting Parties agreed that
―[t]here is a need for positive efforts designed to ensure that the lessdeveloped contracting parties secure a share in the grown in
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development.‖304 Article XXXVI:1 observes that ―export earnings of
the less-developed contracting parties can play a vital part in their
economic development and that the extent of this contribution
depends on . . . the volume of their exports, and the prices received
for these exports.‖305 The provision additionally notes, however, that
―there is a wide gap between standards of living in less-developed
countries and in other countries‖306 and that ―the basic objectives of
this Agreement include the raising of standards of living and the
progressive development of the economies of all contracting
parties.‖307 The provision goes on to observe that this objective ―is
particularly urgent for less-developed contracting parties.‖308
According to this article, GATT Article XXXVI is the clearest
codification of the concept that raising standards of living is a
―development need‖ that may be given effect through S&DT and
other ―positive efforts‖ by WTO Members. From its founding to its
recent efforts, the international trading system has advanced the idea
that the benefits from trade should accrue to those in need of these
benefits.309 Article XXXVI:1(a) recalls that raising living standards
is among the ―basic objectives‖ of the GATT.310 A policy that
champions this goal thus promotes a development need that is within
the contemplation of the WTO.
Additional review of the GATT provisions further reveals
dedicated treatment of the goal of raising living standards and, in
303. GATT art. XXXVI:9.
304. GATT art. XXXVI:3.
305. GATT art. XXXVI:1(b).
306. GATT art. XXXVI:1(c).
307. GATT art. XXXVI:1(a).
308. GATT art. XXXVI:1(a).
309. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 138–44; Gardner, supra note 8, at 62; see
also Press Release, World Trade Org., Free Trade Helps Reduce Poverty, Says
New WTO Secretariat Study (Jun. 13, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/pres00_e/pr181_e.htm #fn1(pointing to more recent activity of the
WTO advancing the goal of channeling trade benefits towards poverty reduction).
310. GATT art. XXXVI:1(a).
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particular, those of less-developed countries. The Contracting
Parties recognized that channeling the benefits of trade and economic
development to the especially impoverished Members is most
consistent with the object and purpose of the GATT.311 Article
XVIII:1 recognizes that ―the attainment of the objectives of this
Agreement will be facilitated by the progressive development of
their economies, particularly those contracting parties the economies
of which can only support low standards of living and are in the early
stages of development.‖312 This provision indicates that less
developed countries may be granted special attention in the
GATT/WTO system; subsequent provisions in Article XVIII grant
LDCs a greater degree of leeway in promoting their development
while remaining in keeping with their GATT obligations.313 For
instance, Article XVIII:2 provides that ―those contracting parties,‖314
i.e., ―those contracting parties the economies of which can only
support low standards of living,‖315 may take protectionist measures
―in order to implement programmes and policies of economic
development designed to raise the general standard of living of their
people, [] take protective or other measures affecting imports, and
that such measures are justified in so far as they facilitate the
attainment of the objectives of [the GATT].‖316 The remainder of
Article XVIII lays out measures these contracting parties may take
towards the attainment of these objectives and, in particular, to raise
the general standard of living of their people.317 Commentators have
treated the phrase ―low standards of living‖ in Article XVIII as
equivalent to poverty.318 Thus, this article submits that GATT
Article XVIII:2 provides textual support for the claim that ―raising
standards of living‖ as used in the Covered Agreements incorporates
311. See GATT art. XVIII:1; see also Raj Bhala, Mercy for the Third World
Through GATT Article XVIII, 6 SING. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 498, 503–04 (2002).
312. GATT art. XVIII:1.
313. KOUL, supra note 52, at 281.
314. GATT art. XVIII:2.
315. GATT art. XVIII:1.
316. GATT art. XVIII:2.
317. GATT art. XVIII:4(a), (b). See generally id. Sections A–D.
318. Steve Charnovitz, International Trade & Developing Countries, 29
FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 259, 259 (2006); Bhala, supra note 313, at 503, 539; see
generally id. (discussing GATT Article XVIII section by section in full detail).
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―poverty reduction‖ as used in economics discourse.319
Beyond the Covered Agreements themselves, the Appellate Body
additionally pointed to multilateral instruments adopted by
international organizations in order to determine, objectively, what
constitutes a development need of LDCs.320 Here as well, one need
not journey too far before the goals of raising living standards and
reducing poverty become evident in the international instruments.
GATT Article XXXVI:6 recognizes the need for collaboration
between the Contracting Parties and ―the international lending
agencies.‖321 The WTO Agreement expressly recognizes the World
Bank in this regard,322 making the Agreement of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (―World Bank
Agreement‖)323 a valid interpretative element.324 One of the
fundamental purposes of the World Bank is ―to promote the long
range balanced growth of international trade . . . thereby assisting in
raising productivity, the standard of living and conditions of
labour.‖325 The practice of the World Bank has commonly
interpreted this provision to include, and indeed, center on, poverty
reduction.326 From this standpoint in particular, the development
319. See R.S. Pathak, International Trade and Environmental Development: A
View From India, 1 INDIANA J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 325, 333 (1994) (―Upon
attaining independence, the new States realized that, among other things, poverty
and low standards of living at home led to comparatively weaker bargaining
positions in the arenas of international diplomacy and international economic
opportunity. The development of national identities made those countries desire
urgent development and modernization, improved conditions of living for their
people, and a more equitable place in the comity of nations.‖); Burns H. Weston,
Basic Human Needs: The International Law Connection: Remarks by the
Chairman, 72 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 224, 226 (1978) (―The poorest people are
in those countries which have the lowest per capita income, the lowest growth rate,
and, paradoxically, the greatest degree of equality—a degree of equality imposed
precisely by the miserably low standards of living of those overall.‖).
320. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 163.
321. GATT art. XXXVI:7.
322. WTO Agreement art. III:5.
323. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, amended Dec. 16,
1965, 16 U.S.T. 1942, 606 U.N.T.S. 294 [hereinafter World Bank Agreement].
324. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 163; see also Mavroidis, supra note 201, at
472-73.
325. World Bank Agreement, supra note 325, art. 1(iii).
326. Carrasco & Kose, supra note 285, at 41.
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needs of raising the standards of living and redistributing income so
as to alleviate poverty are deeply intertwined.
GATT Article XXXVI:7 calls for collaboration between the
Contracting Parties and ―other intergovernmental bodies and the
organs and agencies of the United Nations system, whose activities
relate to the trade and economic development of less-developed
countries.‖327 The United Nations Charter, in Article 55, sets forth
this goal of raising living standards as a founding principle of the
post-war international legal order.328
Later, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (―ICESCR‖)
reaffirmed this goal.329 Article 11(2) of the ICESCR recognizes ―the
fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger‖ and Article
7(a)(ii) recognizes ―the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just
and favorable conditions of work which ensure, in particular, . . .
remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with . . . a
decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the
provisions of [the ICESCR].‖330 From the standpoint of these
multilateral instruments, it becomes increasingly clear that the goal
of raising living standards is meant to address the needs of the
impoverished such that the process of redistributing national income
towards the less-fortunate is integral to this development need.
From the Covered Agreements to other multilateral instruments as
interpretative elements, the goal of raising living standards, with
poverty reduction part and parcel, emerges as a goal that is consistent
with WTO law. The preambles of both the GATT and WTO
Agreement set forth this goal as part of the object and purpose of the
WTO. GATT Articles XXXVI:1 and XVIII:1 further evidence this
objective. Taking the step to other multilateral instruments, Article
55 of the UN Charter, Article 11 of the ICESCR, and Article 1(iii) of
the World Bank Agreement each captures this goal and bolsters the
legal link between raising living standards and poverty reduction.
327. GATT art. XXXVI:7.
328. UN Charter art. 55.
329. ICESCR, supra note 136, art. 11; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Why
International Labor Standards?, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS:
GLOBALIZATION, TRADE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 129, 157 (Robert J. Flanagan &
William B. Gould IV eds., 2003).
330. ICESCR, supra note 136, arts. 11(2), 7(a)(ii).
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This article thus submits that a measure advancing the goal of
reducing poverty in a developing country promotes a development
need within the contemplation of the WTO legal order.
3. Sustainable Development as a Development Need
The preamble of the WTO Agreement additionally recognizes the
goal of sustainability, calling for ―the optimal use of the world‘s
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development.‖331 Sustainable development, the concept of meeting
present needs without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their needs,332 relies most importantly on environmental
protection and conservation of resources.333 If resources are too
rapidly depleted or utilized, the duration over which a nation can
maintain economic processes dependent on that resource is limited,
and the development is unsustainable.334 More particularly, GATT
Article XX has allowed for environmental protection to be
introduced into the WTO‘s institutional framework and dispute
settlement process in relation to the goal of sustainable
development.335
The AB in both U.S. – Gasoline and U.S. – Shrimp found
measures adopted by the U.S. that compromised the conservation of
an ―exhaustible natural resource‖336 to be contrary to the chapeau of

331. WTO Agreement pmbl.; see also Daniel Bodansky & Jessica C. Lawrence,
Trade and Environment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW 505, 515 (Daniel Bethlehem et al. eds., 2009).
332. World Commission on Environment and Development, Report,
Development and International Economic Co-operation: Environment, transmitted
by Note of the Secretary-General, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987)
[hereinafter World Commission Report].
333. Jeffrey Kenners, The Remodeled European Community GSP+: A Positive
Response to the WTO Ruling?, in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 292,
295-96 (George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2007); M.C.W. Pinto,
The Legal Context: Concepts, Principles, Standards and Institutions, in
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A HUMAN FACE 16, 16 (Friedl Weiss et al.
eds., 1998); see generally World Commission Report, supra note 334.
334. Kysar, supra note 245, at 22-23.
335. GATT art. XX(b), (g); Bodansky & Lawrence, supra note 333, at 516;
Howse, Back to Court After Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 172, at 1335-37.
336. See GATT art. XX(g).

2012]

DEFINING ―DEVELOPMENT NEEDS‖

87

Article XX.337 In economic theory, sustainability has routinely been
discussed as essential to economic development.338 To the extent
that a measure supports conservation of exhaustible resources, and
thus, sustainable development, this article submits that the measure
supports a ―development need‖ of developing countries consistent
with the WTO legal framework.
4. Education as a Development Need
Education is not explicitly mentioned in the Covered Agreements
as a means of promoting either macroeconomic growth or a better
standard of living, but in light of multilateral instruments as
interpretative elements,339 education is readily visible as an economic
development need. In both theory and empirical studies, enhanced
education has been shown to lead to growth and specialization of an
economy, and thus enhanced wage-earning potential for individuals
and economic growth.340 Greater specialization and diversification
of the economy is addressed as a means to achieving macroeconomic
growth in the GATT,341 but including education as a development
need requires the inferential step that education promotes this
specialization and diversification.
While a readily made inferential step in light of the economic
theory and studies,342 inclusion of education as a development need
from a legal standpoint is best appreciated in light of certain
provisions in multilateral instruments. Article 55 of the UN Charter
337. U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 219, at 19; U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 234, ¶
129. But see U.S. – Shrimp (Article 21.5–Malaysia), supra note 234, ¶¶ 134, 15253 (upholding the U.S. ban after negotiations proved fruitful); see also Bodansky
& Lawrence, supra note 333, at 516.
338. HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 27–30 (1996); Kenners, supra note 335, at 295-96.
339. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 163 (allowing for such recourse).
340. See, e.g., Fan Zhai & Thomas W. Hertel, Impacts of the DDA on China:
The Role of Labor Markets and Complementary Education Reforms, in POVERTY
AND THE WTO: IMPACTS OF THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 285, 295-98
(Thomas W. Hertel & L. Alan Winters eds., 2006).
341. GATT art. XXXVI:5 (―The rapid expansion of the economies of the lessdeveloped contracting parties will be facilitated by a diversification of the structure
of their economies and the avoidance of an excessive dependence on the export of
primary products.‖).
342. Zhai & Hertel, Impacts of the DDA on China, supra note 342, at 310-15.
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states that the UN is designed to promote ―solutions of international
economic, social, health, and related problems; and international
cultural and educational cooperation,‖343 with all UN Member States
undertaking to take action to achieve this goal.344 Article 13 of the
ICESCR affirms the right of everyone to education.345 However, this
provision alone in the ICESCR requires the deductive step that
education is not simply a development need, for instance, of a social
or cultural character,346 but rather is an economic development
need.347 For this latter step, Article 6 of the ICESCR serves as the
bridge, addressing the importance of training, technical, and
vocational education in support of the right to work.348 Specifically,
Article 6(2) provides that the right to work is fully realized through
―training programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady
economic, social and cultural development.‖349 In light of these
provisions, this article submits that the goal of providing education
and training has consistently been recognized by states as an
economic development need, and that programs, policies, and
mechanisms that advance this goal promote a development need
within the contemplation of the WTO legal order.

C. SYNTHESIS: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS THE WTO‘S OBJECT
AND PURPOSE
As the Appellate Body recognized, the object and purpose of the
343. U.N. Charter art. 55(b).
344. U.N. Charter art. 56.
345. ICESCR, supra note 136, art. 13(1).
346. See id. (providing that education enables ―all persons to participate
effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship
among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the
activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.‖). From this stand
point, education can be viewed as a social or cultural need, but this provision of the
ICESCR is notably silent on the economic benefits of education.
347. See AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 92 (recognizing that the objective and
purpose of the Enabling Clause is to promote LDCs‘ economic development).
348. See United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, General Comment 13: The Right to Education, ¶ 15, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (Dec. 8, 1999) (discussing technical and vocational
education as jointly falling under the right to education and the right to work,
promoting economic as well as social and cultural development).
349. ICESCR, supra note 136, art. 6(2).
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Enabling Clause is to promote economic development,350 and that of
the WTO Agreement is to ensure that developing countries receive a
share of international trade commensurate with their needs.351 Thus,
any goals or needs promoted by the Enabling Clause and that fall
within the WTO‘s ambit must necessarily relate to economic goals
and needs. Advocates of human rights protections and good
governance as development needs within the WTO‘s contemplation
face the uphill battle of relating these goals back to some driver of
economic development. As to goals such as poverty reduction,
sustainable development, and education, beyond macroeconomic
growth through increased market access, economic analysis readily
demonstrates the impact of these pursuits on economic
development.352 As a matter of law, this article has argued that these
goals are just as much encapsulated in (1) the Covered Agreements
and (2) related multilateral instruments that serve as interpretative
elements of WTO-consistent rights and obligations. Thus, measures
conducive to these aims ―respond positively to the development,
financial, and trade needs of developing countries.‖353

CONCLUSION
With an institution as powerful as the WTO that aims to promote
economic development and has seen success towards this end, it goes
without saying that developing countries will fight for a greater voice
in this forum. Observed with notable frequency in the Covered
Agreements, the development needs of developing countries are
singled out and given special attention. The institution can leave it to
the practice of nations to determine exactly what constitutes
―development needs.‖ But the institutional goals of the WTO and its
dispute settlement system to promote predictability and consistency
would be well served by articulating these development, financial,
and trade needs so that they may serve as bounds and guideposts for
the practice of WTO Members. To that end, this article sought to
begin to spell out some of the prominent development needs

350.
351.
352.
353.

AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 91-92.
AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 168.
See supra notes 271-287, 341-351 and accompanying text.
Enabling Clause, supra note 10, at ¶ 3(c).
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ingrained in the WTO legal framework. The hope of this article is
that through these four ―development needs‖ of market access,
poverty reduction, sustainable development, and education, the
overlapping coverage of economic, social, and human rights
objectives espoused by WTO Members can be pursued in a manner
consistent with WTO law.

